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INDICATORS AND INCIDENTS OF POTENTIAL COLLUSION AMONG 
MAIN CONTRACTING FIRMS IN MUNICIPAL ROAD NETWORK 
PROJECTS: THE SAUDI ARABIAN CONTEXT 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The development of legal and regulatory instruments to address suspected collusive 
practices in the Saudi Arabian public works sector will hasten the demand for baseline 
evidence on the extent of illicit behaviour among bidders. Currently, there is scant 
knowledge and little empirical analysis of the scope and scale of such uncompetitive 
practices in the Saudi Arabian construction industry. This paper aims to establish the 
indicators and incidents of potential bid rigging in the Saudi Arabian public works 
sector through a two-step historical analysis of bidding data. This analysis examines 
PDUNHWFRQFHQWUDWLRQPHWULFVDQGPHDVXUHVRIWKHYRODWLOLW\RIELGGHUV¶SULFHVduring 
tender bid submissions for municipal road network projects over the past five years in 
three main municipalities of the country. The preliminary results of the two-stage 
analysis indicate evidence for collusion among bidders in the less-populated, 
geographically dispersed regions of the country, which are under less government 
control, oversight, and supervision than the more populous, central regions of the 
Kingdom. This analysis provides market intelligence to enable further investigations 
into potential collusion among contracting firms in the future. 
Keywords: bid rigging, collusion, corruption, public procurement, Saudi Arabia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
INTRODUCTION  
The public construction works industry is currently considered a key driver of the 
Saudi Arabian economy, with total government expenditure over the last decade 
exceeding $400 billion (Ministry of Finance, 2014), and in 2014 it comprised 5.47% 
of the national GDP (CDSI, 2014). However, Bowen, Edwards, and Cattell (2013), 
Osei-Tutu, Badu, and Owusu-Manu (2010), and Kenny (2007), have revealed that 
construction activities are prone to corrupt practices, particularly in relation to the 
procurement of projects in developing market economies. 
Among other collusive practices, bid rigging in public works procurement has 
emerged as a key target for national and international competition watchdogs. The 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in the UK noted a drop in prices of the order of 30% 
after OFT action against hard-core cartels. Two potential victims of anticompetitive 
behaviour by bidding companies in public tendering are the contracting authority as 
the direct purchased and business participants in the tender that choose not to join a 
cartel (Maci, 2012). 
Based on the Competition and Market Authority (CMA, 2014), bid rigging occurs 
when a group of bidders agree to limit competition in the procurement process, 
thereby denying a customer a fair price; this involves cover bidding, bid suppression, 
bid rotation, and market allocation contracts. Recent studies on this practice illustrate 
WKHVLJQL¿FDQWHFRQRPLFGDPDJHFDXVHGE\ELGULJJLQJ, where recurrence, overcharge, 
and duration are the three most important factors in determining the amount of harm 
caused by collusion (Huschelrath, 2013).  Inefficiency is a negative economic outcome 
of collusion on the market (Asker, 2010), which consequently increases standard 
market costs to the monopoly level and creates a non-competitive bidding 
environment (Zarkada-Fraser and Skitmore, 1998; Huschelrath, 2013).  
In the Saudi Arabian context, the Competition Law (2014) aims to protect and 
encourage fair competition, including public works procurement and compact 
monopolistic practices that affect lawful competition. This is achieved through an 
independent council, the Competition Protection Council; however, there has been 
little empirical analysis of the scope and scale of uncompetitive practices in the Saudi 
Arabian context. Therefore this paper investigates suspicious bid rigging patterns in 
the Saudi Arabian construction industry, encompassing municipal road construction 
and maintenance contracts programmes, and presents some of the core findings of the 
indicators and incidents of potential collusion among main contracting firms in 
municipal road network projects. 
 
CONTEXT 
Recent studies in the field focus on three main themes: collusion patterns and 
mechanisms, detection methods, and how to prevent the market. However, this paper 
aims to identify indicators and incidents of potential collusion in order to underline 
suspected local bid rigging mechanisms and thereby facilitate the proposed detection 
methods. Consequently, the literature on bid-rigging mechanisms and detection will be 
reviewed here. 
Heimler (2012) listed several characteristics of cartels that may facilitate collusion 
mechanisms as follows: 
x The agreement among competitors must be secret. 
  
x The objective of the agreement must be to significantly weaken the rivalry 
among competitors. 
x The cartel must operate by raising prices over the normal competitive level and 
restricting output. 
Ishii (2014) described the methods of coordination used by ring members in their bids; 
either ring members would determine a value called the µreference price¶ in a meeting, 
with the winner assigned to bid below the reference price and the losers assigned to 
bid above it, RUWKHZLQQHUZRXOG¿UVWdecide on his bid and then communicate that bid 
to other ring members, who would bid above it. 
With regard to methods for the detection of collusion, competition authorities can 
choose from various reactive and proactive methods to detect hard core-cartels 
(Huschelrath, 2013). To detect bid-rigging, antitrust enforcers can use a leniency 
program, which is currently the most effective reactive means and instrument; 
however, collusion in public construction works is less affected by such programmes 
(Chotibhonhs & Arditi, 2013).  Several recent studies have utilised a proactive method 
based upon evidence of bid rotation agreements, which can be found by collecting 
data across bids, although the generation of such information can be difficult. Porter 
and Zona (1993) proposed a regression model to investigate abnormalities for state 
highway construction contracts, and in the same context, Pesendorfer (2000) 
investigated differences in cost structures, whilst Bajari and Ye (2003) used a 
regression model to predict collusion in highway contracts by considering bid 
independency and exchangeability. Chotibhongs and Arditi (2012) proposed statistical 
tests to permit owners to identify suspected cartel bidders given sufficient historical 
bidding data. They confirmed that bids by potential cartel bidders cluster more densely 
than those by non-cartel bidders, because cartel bidders try to regulate and control the 
competitive bidding environment by forcing other bidders to bid higher, but not too 
much higher, than their offer. In a related context, Suntharanurak (2012) analysed the 
structure of the rural road market by measuring market concentration using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), and found that an increased number of bidders 
could reduce the opportunities for collusion in the procurement market.  
Most researchers have reflected upon the difficulty of using a single tool to detect 
potential collusion practices. However, as bidding procedures regularly create the 
necessary information for behavioural evaluations, bid-rigging practices are amenable 
to the application of screening tools (Huschelrath, 2013). An in-depth behavioural 
study of suspicious industries is the second of two steps in a screening method that 
aims to collect evidence for real-world collusion (Huschelrath, 2009). 
METHODOLOGY 
The above literature review has revealed a lack of empirical analysis of the Saudi 
Arabian public construction industry and the scope of suspected collusion. In this 
paper, we propose a model for conducting the second step of a screening process that 
establishes the indicators and incidents of potential bid rigging in the Saudi Arabian 
public works sector. The intention is to explore the market structure of the local 
municipal roads construction market, and thereby to facilitate future detection of 
collusive bidding by competition authorities. On the recommendation of Kashiwagi 
(2015), which stipulates that a deductive logic based approach and mixed methods 
should be used to identify research data and reach a conclusion, a deductive logic 
approach has been implemented in this research. We consider local municipal road 
network projects because of the high rate of recurrent contracts, a lack of product 
  
differentiation, and the stable demand in local procurement practices, which are 
considered significant factors in motivating bidders to collude. Suspicious forms of 
bid rigging, such as market allocation, bid suppression, and bid rotation, are all 
investigated. 
Municipal road projects are administered by 16 Kingdom-wide major municipalities, 
with each comprising many sub-municipalities of major cities and affiliated smaller 
towns. The Ministry of Finance provides financing for these projects according to the 
municipality budget, which is approved annually. Local municipal road projects in 
Saudi Arabia fall into four categories: 
x Asphalting and paving roads, and lighting. 
x Improving and beautifying entrances and roundabouts. 
x Construction of bridges and tunnels. 
x Restoration of older roads. 
The Ministry of Municipalities separates contractors for roads projects into five 
classes, each of which has a contractual financial limit that cannot be exceeded (Table 
1). This includes the consideration of contractor capabilities and technical 
possibilities, which include management and technical expertise, equipment, and 
performance on previous projects. Likewise, they evaluate the financial status of each 
contractor, including their budget, profit and loss account, cash flow, and sources of 
funding. 
 
Contractor Class 
Contract Financial Limit 
Saudi Arabian Riyal 
(million) 
Class A >420 
Class B 420 
Class C 140 
Class D 42 
Class E 14 
Unclassified 4.4 
Table 1: Classification of municipal roads contractors (Ministry of 
Municipalities) 
 
The purpose of this study is to establish the indicators and incidents of potential 
collusion within this market. A two-step historical analysis of tender bid submission 
patterns, encompassing municipal road construction and maintenance contracts, is 
adopted.  Due to the time limitations for data collection, a convenience sampling 
strategy is employed whereby three municipalities are selected from all the 
municipalities in Saudi Arabia. In order that these municipalities remain anonymous, 
the phonetic alphabet coding system has been adopted to identify each of them. 
 
 
 
 
  
Municipality 
Population 
(million) 
Geographic 
Municipal Road Contracts 
Number 
Value 
Saudi Arabian 
Riyal (billion) 
Alpha 1.77 Mountainous terrain 102 3.01 
Beta 1.06 Desert area 111 2.08 
Gamma 4.03 Coastal area 114 4.67 
Table 2: Characteristics of the selected municipalities 
  
An oligopoly is considered one of the outcomes of collusion (Doree, 2004), and is 
similar to the goal of some market mergers. Therefore, we measured the market 
concentration index (HHI) of our sample, which includes 320 contracts, in order to 
identify in which contracts collusion is likely. The HHI is a primary concentration 
measure which is utilised as a part of the antitrust examination, and is calculated as the 
sum of the squared market shares of all market participants. The United States 
Department of Justice Agencies consider markets with an HHI under 1500 points to be 
non-concentrated, markets with an HHI between 1,500 and 2,500 points to be 
moderately concentrated, and markets with an HHI above 2,500 points to be highly 
concentrated (US Department of Justice, 2010). Consequently, the size of the 
monopolist class will be examined, as Heimler (2012) observed that the number of 
players in a collusion agreement is almost never higher than ten and is very often 
ORZHUWKDQ¿YH In this study, we assume that there is a collusion agreement between 
the same class of contractors in order to reduce the level of competition and to 
increase the barriers to entering the market. 
In the second step the participation rate will be analysed for the suspected markets 
before measuring the volatility of the bidder prices for the market controlled by a 
small number of players. Volatility of bidder prices is computed as the standard 
deviation of the percentage change in the offers' prices. It is reasonable to expect a 
reduction in price volatilities after the effective execution of a bid rigging scheme 
(Huschelrath, 2013).  If the participation rate reduces bidding variation, then this is an 
indication of successful collusion (Fraser and Skitmore, 2000). This detection method 
has been utilised by the Swiss Competition Commission. Unlike other detection 
methods, both the HHI and price volatility do not need disclosed collusion cases to be 
utilised, which makes them suitable for the available Saudi Arabian road contracts 
data, which has never revealed any cases of collusion within the public procurement 
market. Hence, we will obtain an in-depth understanding of the composition and 
features of suspected collusion, and consequently be able to develop indicators and 
incidents of potential collusion practices among the main contracting firms bidding for 
municipal road network projects. 
  
 
Figure 1: Proposed model to investigate collusion in public procurement  
 
An eight-digit coding system has been implemented to identify contractors in this 
UHVHDUFK 7KH ILUVW WKUHH GLJLWV LGHQWLI\ WKH ORFDWLRQ RI D FRQWUDFWRU¶V KHDGTXDUWHUV
while the middle two dLJLWV LGHQWLI\ D FRQWUDFWRU¶V FODVV DQG WKH ODVW WKUHH GLJLWV
UHSUHVHQWDFRQWUDFWRU¶VQXPEHURQWKH0LQLVWU\RI0XQLFLSDOLWLHVOLVW 
 
Location Class List# 
     
     
ALF - 02 - 079 
 
Figure 2: Identification coding for contractors  
 
DISCUSSION  
 
Alpha Municipality 
This domain includes a major city, which has a population of 1.9 million, and an urban 
area of 15,159.3 hectares, as well as two large towns and various villages with 
populations not exceeding 100,000. Mountainous terrain is the distinguishing feature 
of this municipality. High values for the market concentration index (HHI) were found 
for the municipal road projects in this municipality (Table 3). 
Project Type 
Local Outer 
HHI 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Asphalting 0.0 36.7 20.4 34.7 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3061.23 
Bridges  40.0 10.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 3375.00 
Restoration 5.3 26.3 31.6 10.5 21.1 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2324.17 
Roundabouts 0.0 22.2 0.0 66.7 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 5086.73 
Table 3: HHI test results for the Alpha municipality 
 
Local second-class contractors shared 36.73% of the asphalting, paving, and lighting 
projects in this municipality, whilst local fourth-class contractors shared 34.96% of 
  
these projects. First-class local contractors shared 40.00% of ongoing bridge and 
tunnel projects, and 66.67% of town entrances and roundabout projects were shared by 
local fourth-class contractors. 
Table 4 shows the group sizes of each contractor class in the Alpha municipality. On 
the basis of this table, we excluded local fourth-class contractors from further 
investigations because this group contains a very high number of members (73), which 
would make coordination among them difficult and inhibit the collusion mechanisms 
described in the literature review. We also excluded the 5th class for the same reason. 
 
Classification Members 
1st class 6 
2nd class 10 
3rd class 19 
4th class 73 
5th class 121 
Table 4: Classification sizes of the Alpha contractor groups 
 
The volatility of prices for asphalting projects shared by local second-class contractors 
is lower than for those shared by the other classes (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Price volatility of asphalting projects in the Alpha Municipality  
 
The average number of contractors participating in these bids exceeds six; however, 
only three of the local second-class contractors participated in all of the bids. The 
fourth- and fifth-class contractors (194 in total) generally did not participate, although 
the majority of the projects were available to them. Among the local second-class 
contractors bidding, Contractor ALP-02-006 achieved a bidding success rate of 100% 
for projects sited outside the major city, but did not succeed in any projects within the 
city. Meanwhile, Contractor ALP-02-002 achieved a success rate of 81.81% for 
projects sited within the major city and did not win any projects in towns and villages. 
This suggests the possibility of bid rigging among the group of local second-class 
contractors to monopolise asphalt, paving, and lighting municipal road projectsusing 
the market allocation form.  With respect to bridge and tunnel projects, price volatility 
was slightly higher (0.23), and Contractor ALP-01-001 was the only local first-class 
participant in all of the tenders, achieving a success rate of 100%. Therefore, this does 
not indicate probable collusion among the local first-class contractors. 
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Beta Municipality 
This municipality includes a major city and number of smaller towns, which together 
have a population of 1.06 million. An analysis of the market concentration index 
(HHI) for municipal road projects in this municipality (Table 5) shows high HHIs in 
some project types. 
Project Types 
Local Outer 
HHI 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Asphalting 0.0 12.2 31.7 14.6 0.0 9.8 9.8 17.1 4.9 0.0 1873.9 
Bridges  14.3 0.0 0.0 14.3 0.0 71.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5510.2 
Restoration 14.3 14.3 28.6 11.4 5.7 2.9 20.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 1804.1 
Roundabouts 0.0 5.3 10.5 15.8 52.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.8 0.0 3407.2 
Table 5: HHI test results for the Beta Municipality 
 
Local third-class contractors shared 31.7% of asphalting, paving, and lighting projects, 
whilst outer first-class contractors shared 71.4% of ongoing bridge and tunnel projects. 
Additionally, local fifth-class contractors shared 52.6% of town entrance and 
roundabout projects.  From the group sizes of each contractor class in this 
municipality (Table 6), we have excluded local fifth-class contractors from further 
investigations because this group has 107 contractors, making coordination unlikely. 
Additionally, bridge and tunnel projects shared by the outer first-class group are 
excluded. 
Classification Members 
1st class 13 
2nd class 9 
3rd class 14 
4th class 68 
5th class 107 
Table 6: Classification sizes of the Beta contractor groups 
 
The price volatility of asphalting projects shared by local second-class contractors was 
lower than for other asphalting projects (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Price volatility of asphalting projects in the Beta Municipality 
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With regard to rates of participation in bids for these asphalting projects, the average 
number of participating contractors was five in the main city and three in the smaller 
towns. Contractor BET-03-001 participated in the majority of these bids, whilst local 
fourth- and fifth-class contractors (175 in total) did not, despite the availability of the 
projects; Contractor BET-03-001 subsequently achieved a success rate of 90.7%. Out 
of the road restoration projects shared by local third-class contractors, Contractor 
BET-03-008 was awarded 100% of the seven bids in which he participated, whilst 
Contractor BET-03-001 was awarded three out of the four in which he participated; 
notably, these two contractors rarely bid against each other. 
 
Gamma Municipality 
The Gamma Municipality encompasses a metropolitan city and several small coastal 
towns. As with the other municipalities examined, the market concentration index 
(HHI) for municipal road projects is high for some project types (Table 7). 
Project types 
Local Outer 
HHI 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Asphalting 25.6 18.6 27.9 7.0 7.0 9.3 0.0 2.3 2.3 0.0 1974.04 
Bridges  39.1 0.0 0.0 8.7 0.0 43.5 0.0 0.0 4.3 4.3 3534.97 
Restoration 20.0 15.0 10.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 1600.00 
Roundabouts 35.7 0.0 21.4 35.7 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3061.22 
Table 7: HHI test results for the Gamma Municipality 
 
Local first-class contractors shared 39.1%, and outer first-class contractors shared 
43.5% of bridge and tunnel projects. In addition, local first-class contractors shared 
35.7% of ongoing town entrance and roundabout projects. This region contains six 
local first-class contractors, but only three were awarded contracts. Contractors GAM-
01-004, GAM-01-005, and GAM-01-006 did not compete against each other. 
Contractor GAM-01-004 achieved a success rate of 46.2% for bridge and tunnel 
projects within the metropolitan city, and faced competition from some international 
contractors, whilst Contractor GAM-01-006 achieved a success rate of 100% for 
bridge and tunnel projects outside the metropolitan city. Meanwhile, Contractor 
GAM-01-005 achieved a 100% success rate for town entrance and roundabout 
projects.  The price volatility of bridge and tunnel contracts awarded by the first-class 
contractors within the metropolitan city was higher than the price volatility for the 
same contracts outside the metropolitan city. However, the rate of participation in bids 
for contracts outside the metropolitan city was less than three. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of the paper was to ascertain the indicators and incidents of potential bid 
rigging in the Saudi Arabian municipal road development sector through incorporating 
a deductive, two-step historical analysis of bidding data.  The analysis has examined 
PDUNHWFRQFHQWUDWLRQPHWULFVDQGPHDVXUHVRIWKHYRODWLOLW\RIELGGHUV¶SULFHVLQWHQGHU
bid submissions for municipal road network development projects, encompassing 
6DXGL $UDELD¶V WKUHH PDLQ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH UHJLRQV RYHU a five-year period.  This 
research has demonstrated a scarcity of local fourth- and fifth-class participation in 
bidding, despite the availability of the project value limits. Moreover, industry 
participation in the bidding rate overwhelmingly decreased among projects in small 
towns and villages.  Consequently, some top-class contractors won a suspiciously high 
  
proportion of these contracts, most of which were for asphalting, paving, and lighting 
projects. This suggests that these contractors may have applied the market allocation 
approach by employing the bid suppression concept, which is indicated by the low rate 
of participation in tenders. As already mentioned in the literature review, price 
volatility can be utilised to detect bid rotation, but is inadequate for the detection of 
bid suppression with a low rate of participation in tenders.  Due to data collection time 
limitations this paper has presented the analysis outcomes of 320 contracts from the 
selected municipalities over the past 5 years, consequently further investigations needs 
to be conducted for other municipalities as part of the process of verification.   
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